ACE Seminar: Identifying Cheaters in Secure Multi-Party Computation

Speaker: Peter Scholl

Date/Time: 24-Nov-2016, 16:00 UTC

Venue: Gordon Street(25) - Room D103



Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows several parties to evaluate a function on their private inputs, learning only the output. If more than half of the parties are corrupt then most existing protocols only provide "security with abort", where an adversary can force the computation to fail whilst remaining undetected. This makes these protocols vulnerable to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.

In this talk I will first give a gentle introduction to secret-sharing based MPC, and then discuss the model of identifiable abort, which prevents DoS attacks by allowing the honest parties to identity cheaters. I will describe a recent work from TCC 2016-B, which constructs the first efficient MPC protocol with identifiable abort. Our protocol has an information-theoretic online phase, and is only around n times slower than the most efficient non-identifiable protocols. A key component of the protocol is a linearly homomorphic information-theoretic signature scheme, for which we provide the first definitions and construction based on a previous non-homomorphic scheme.


Peter Scholl is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Bristol, where he completed his PhD in 2016 under the supervision of Prof. Nigel Smart. His main research interests are multi-party computation (MPC), particularly constructing more efficient protocols with improved security properties, as well as implementation and applications of MPC.

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