ACE Seminar: Universally Optimal Design For Minimum Information Leakage

Speaker: Dr Arman Khouzani

Date/Time: 09-Feb-2017, 16:00 UTC

Venue: Gordon Square (16-18) 101



Perfect secrecy describes cases where an adversary cannot learn anything about the secret beyond its prior distribution. A
classical result by Shannon shows that a necessary condition for perfect secrecy is that the adversary should not be able to eliminate
any of the possible secrets.This presentation answers the following fundamental question: What is the lowest leakage of information
that can be achieved when some of the secrets have to be eliminated? We address this question by deriving the minimum leakage
in closed-form, and explicitly providing randomized strategies that achieves this fundamental minimum. These strategies are "universally optimal", in the sense that, they guarantee the minimum leakage irrespective of the measure of entropy used to quantify the leakage. Subsequently, we show that our schemes constitute the Nash Equilibria of closely related two-person zero sum games. This game perspective provides implicit solutions for a wider set of structural constraints and asymmetric entropies. The talk ends with some potential application examples in "bucketing" and "fingerprinting".


Arman Khouzani received a B.Sc. degree in EE form Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran, in 2006, and a PhD in ESE from the University of Pennsylvania (UPenn), Philadelphia, PA  in 2011 with the best dissertation award among his class. He has since held postdoctoral research positions with the Ohio State University (OSU), the University of Southern California (USC), Royal Holloway, University of London (RHUL), and most recently, Queen Mary, University of London (QMUL). Since November of 2016, he is a lecturer in the Theory Group of the EECS department at QMUL.

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